Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind /

by McLaughlin, Brian P [edt]; Cohen, Jonathan D [edt].
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Contemporary debates in philosophy.Publisher: Malden, Mass. : Blackwell Pub., c2007Description: xx, 288 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.ISBN: 9781405117609 (hardcover : alk. paper); 1405117605 (hardcover : alk. paper); 9781405117616 (pbk. : alk. paper); 1405117613 (pbk. : alk. paper).Subject(s): Philosophy of mindOnline resources: Table of contents only | Contributor biographical information | Publisher description
Contents:
Mental content -- Is there a viable notion of narrow mental content? -- Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions / Gabriel Segal -- There is no viable notion of narrow content / Sarah Sawyer -- Is externalism about mental content compatible with privileged access? -- Externalism and privileged access are consistent / Anthony Brueckner -- Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent / Michael McKinsey -- Is the intentional essentially normative? -- Normativism defended / Ralph Wedgwood -- Resisting normativism in psychology / Georges Rey -- Is there non-conceptual content? -- The revenge of the given / Jerry Fodor -- Are there different kinds of content? / Richard G. Heck, Jr.-- Physicalism -- Is non-reductive materialism viable? -- Everybody has got it: a defense of non-reductive materialism / Louise Antony -- The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism / Paul M. Churchland -- Should physicalists be a priori physicalists? -- A priori physicalism / Frank Jackson -- On the limits of a priori physicalism / Brian P. McLaughlin -- Is there an unresolved problem of mental causation? -- Causation and mental causation / Jaegwon Kim -- Mental causation, or something near enough / Barry Loewer -- The place of consciousness in nature -- Is consciousness ontologically emergent from the physical? -- Dualist emergentism martine / Nida-Rmelin -- Against ontologically emergent consciousness / David Braddon-Mitchell -- Are phenomenal characters and intentional contents of experiences identical? -- New troubles for the qualia freak / Michael Tye -- A case for qualia / Sydney Shoemaker -- Is awareness of our mental acts a kind of perceptual consciousness? -- All consciousness is perceptual / Jesse Prinz -- Mental action and self-awareness / Christopher Peacocke.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Mental content -- Is there a viable notion of narrow mental content? -- Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions / Gabriel Segal -- There is no viable notion of narrow content / Sarah Sawyer -- Is externalism about mental content compatible with privileged access? -- Externalism and privileged access are consistent / Anthony Brueckner -- Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent / Michael McKinsey -- Is the intentional essentially normative? -- Normativism defended / Ralph Wedgwood -- Resisting normativism in psychology / Georges Rey -- Is there non-conceptual content? -- The revenge of the given / Jerry Fodor -- Are there different kinds of content? / Richard G. Heck, Jr.-- Physicalism -- Is non-reductive materialism viable? -- Everybody has got it: a defense of non-reductive materialism / Louise Antony -- The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism / Paul M. Churchland -- Should physicalists be a priori physicalists? -- A priori physicalism / Frank Jackson -- On the limits of a priori physicalism / Brian P. McLaughlin -- Is there an unresolved problem of mental causation? -- Causation and mental causation / Jaegwon Kim -- Mental causation, or something near enough / Barry Loewer -- The place of consciousness in nature -- Is consciousness ontologically emergent from the physical? -- Dualist emergentism martine / Nida-Rmelin -- Against ontologically emergent consciousness / David Braddon-Mitchell -- Are phenomenal characters and intentional contents of experiences identical? -- New troubles for the qualia freak / Michael Tye -- A case for qualia / Sydney Shoemaker -- Is awareness of our mental acts a kind of perceptual consciousness? -- All consciousness is perceptual / Jesse Prinz -- Mental action and self-awareness / Christopher Peacocke.