|Location||Call number||Status||Date due|
|128.2 M1616 (Browse shelf)||Available|
|128.2 B6247 La mente temporale :||128.2 D399 Dai batteri a Bach :||128.2 D5699 La mente estesa :||128.2 M1616 Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind /||128.2 M244 L'universo della mente /||128.2 P991 Mente, corpo, mondo /||128.2 R994 Il concetto di mente /|
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Mental content -- Is there a viable notion of narrow mental content? -- Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions / Gabriel Segal -- There is no viable notion of narrow content / Sarah Sawyer -- Is externalism about mental content compatible with privileged access? -- Externalism and privileged access are consistent / Anthony Brueckner -- Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent / Michael McKinsey -- Is the intentional essentially normative? -- Normativism defended / Ralph Wedgwood -- Resisting normativism in psychology / Georges Rey -- Is there non-conceptual content? -- The revenge of the given / Jerry Fodor -- Are there different kinds of content? / Richard G. Heck, Jr.-- Physicalism -- Is non-reductive materialism viable? -- Everybody has got it: a defense of non-reductive materialism / Louise Antony -- The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism / Paul M. Churchland -- Should physicalists be a priori physicalists? -- A priori physicalism / Frank Jackson -- On the limits of a priori physicalism / Brian P. McLaughlin -- Is there an unresolved problem of mental causation? -- Causation and mental causation / Jaegwon Kim -- Mental causation, or something near enough / Barry Loewer -- The place of consciousness in nature -- Is consciousness ontologically emergent from the physical? -- Dualist emergentism martine / Nida-Rmelin -- Against ontologically emergent consciousness / David Braddon-Mitchell -- Are phenomenal characters and intentional contents of experiences identical? -- New troubles for the qualia freak / Michael Tye -- A case for qualia / Sydney Shoemaker -- Is awareness of our mental acts a kind of perceptual consciousness? -- All consciousness is perceptual / Jesse Prinz -- Mental action and self-awareness / Christopher Peacocke.